We carry out experiments on the Stackelberg game and the second-play Stackelberg game where the leader can revise his decision after the follower has decided. In the second-play Stackelberg game, the leader's first announcement is cheap talk. The game settings studied include fixed pairs and random matching, and settings where the follower's information about the leader's payoffs is complete or incomplete. The results show that a high percentage of players converge to cooperative and equal-payoffs outcomes in fixed pairs and to Cournot-Nash equilibrium outcomes in random matching. There are no Stackelberg equilibrium outcomes. We conclude that cheap talk is used to support cooperation in fixed pairs. This is the first experiment on cheap talk in a Stackelberg setting and the results are in line with the coordination and reassurance hypotheses presented earlier in the cheap talk literature. JEL classification codes: C72, C91, D43, D82, L13
Introduction
The Stackelberg game describes a situation where two players decide in a sequence. The leader decides first and announces his decision to the follower, who decides by taking the leader's announcement into account (Von Stackelberg, 1934 .) The sequential duopoly model is a traditional application. (See e.g. Varian, 1993 .) The Stackelberg setting can also arise from informational hunt game experiment, but also misrepresentations of cheap talk in a prisoner's dilemma game. Croson et al. (2003) study deceptive cheap talk in an ultimatum game experiment and find that players lie about their private information and make threats about future actions. Charness and Rabin (2005) study cheap talk in sequential dictator and response games, and find that the effect of cheap talk depends on past favorable or unfavorable behavior. Blume and Ortmann (2007) report from an experiment that cheap talk coordinates the most efficient equilibrium between multiple Pareto-ranked equilibria. They also find that message profiles change over time, suggesting that players use cheap talk repeatedly as negotiation statements. Kawagoe and Takizawa (2009) study two player incomplete information games with cheap talk communication with varying degrees of alignment in preferences. They find that even though aligned preferences induce cheap talk to separate between equilibria, cheap talk works even when preferences are conflicting. Ellingsen and Östling (2010) study cheap talk in a theoretical cognitive hierarchy model and find that both oneway and two-way communication improves coordination in many kinds of games. Like Crawford (1998), they suggest that cheap talk plays a reassurance role in coordination.
In this article, we conduct experiments with the Stackelberg game, and we also include the case of the Hämäläinen (1981) where the leader has a second-play option with cheap talk. This is the first time cheap talk is studied in a Stackelberg experiment. In general there is a growing interest in experiments with the sequential duopoly model. Huck et al. (2001) observe that Stackelberg equilibrium outcomes are rare when players are randomly matched. Rather than acting as leaders and followers, the players choose so that the results are close to the Cournot-Nash equilibrium in which payoffs are equal. When the player pairs are fixed, they often cooperate and reach the joint optimum outcome. Huck and Müller (2000) conduct Stackelberg experiments with the Bagwell's (1995) model in which the Stackelberg leader's decision is observed only imperfectly by the follower. They find convergence to the Stackelberg equilibrium, but the payoff matrix used in their experiment is very simple with only four different outcome possibilities. Huck et al. (2002) , Fonseca et al. (2005) and Fonseca et al. (2006) conduct Stackelberg experiments with the Hamilton and Slutsky (1990) models of endogenous timing, where the players can decide whether to act in the first or in the second stage. Like Huck et al. (2001) , they use a 13 × 13 payoff matrix. In contrast to Huck and Müller (2000) , Huck et al. (2002) , Fonseca et al. (2005) and Fonseca et al. (2006) find that Stackelberg outcomes are rare and Cournot outcomes at the second decision stage are frequent, and that players act with reciprocity. The experimental supply chain wholesaler-retailer setting of Loch and Wu (2008) with sequential decisions and decreasing reaction functions is also a Stackelberg game. They find that players cooperate when they are given the possibility for that.
There is less cooperation when the best performing player is highlighted as "winner". Introduction of this status-seeking condition changes the situation. Müller and Tan (2011) study the Stackelberg setting where players decide in groups, and they too observe that Stackelberg equilibrium outcomes are rare.
It has been shown that cooperation emerges in many experiments with repeated games (for reviews, see e.g. Dawes and Thaler, 1988 , Palfrey and Rosenthal, 1994 , and Fehr and Gächter, 2000 . In the Huck et al. (2001) experiment, cooperation develops in fixed pairs, and the authors suggest that the result reflects inequity aversion. Many other results from ultimatum bargaining and dictator games, public goods games, and prisoner's dilemmas, also demonstrate how cooperation arises: some players avoid outcomes with large payoff differences, and some players behave reciprocally, rewarding fairness and punishing unfairness (see e.g. Gächter, 2000, and Sobel, 2005) . Behavioral preference-based models derived from experimental results propose that cooperating and inequity averse players are motivated by social preferences. Such social preferences are e.g. fairness in the inequity aversion theory of Fehr and Schmidt (1999) , or reciprocity in the theory of revealed altruism of Cox et al. (2008) . However, as some experimental studies suggest (e.g. Dreber et al., 2011) , social preferences may not have a role in cooperation, if maintaining cooperation is possible in a repeated setting. Cooperation in an infinitely repeated supergame can be maintained as an equilibrium strategy, as argued by the folk theorem, and this idea is also observed in experiments to some degree (see e.g. Roth, 1988, Andreoni and Miller, 1993) .
In our experiment we use the same market situation and a 13 × 13 payoff matrix as Huck et al. (2001) . The payoff functions and decision sets that determine the payoff matrix are the same as in the experiments of Huck et al. (2001 Huck et al. ( , 2002 , Fonseca et al. (2005 Fonseca et al. ( , 2006 , and Müller and Tan (2011) . We study eight settings, including the Stackelberg and second-play Stackelberg (Hämäläinen, 1981) games. In each of these settings the payoff information to the follower is either complete or incomplete. The incomplete information setting is implemented so that the follower does not know the leader's payoffs but only his own payoffs. We conduct all experiments with both fixed pairs and random matching. The players repeat the games for twenty to twenty-four rounds in each setting without knowing the total number of rounds before the end of the last round.
Based on earlier results from Stackelberg experiments and other games discussed above, we expect cooperation and Cournot-Nash equilibrium play to take place also in our new experimental settings. This is exactly what happens in our experiment: many players cooperate in the fixed pairs settings, and end up in Cournot-Nash outcomes in random matching. Instead of unequal Stackelberg outcomes, the equal payoff outcomes are frequent in all settings. We also find that the inclusion of leader's cheap talk in the second-play Stackelberg games does not completely revert the setting to the follower's benefit, but instead, that the leaders remain in a slightly better position overall.
The experiment
We consider a duopoly model with a leader and a follower, who decide upon production quantities x, y, respectively, in a sequence. The joint production quantity determines the payoffs, p L (x,y) = x (24 -x -y) for the leader and p F (x,y) = y (24 -x -y) for the follower. The payoff matrix is shown in Figure 1 . It is symmetric, hence equal payoff outcomes are on the main diagonal where the production quantity decisions are equal. When the leader produces more than the follower he gets more payoff, and these outcomes are below the diagonal. When the follower produces more, he gets more payoff and these outcomes are above the diagonal.
We study two games in the experiment. One is the Stackelberg game where the leader decides upon his quantity first and after observing the leader's decision, the follower decides upon his quantity. The other is the second-play Stackelberg game of Hämäläinen (1981) , where the leader first decides upon an announcement of a quantity. After observing the leader's announcement, the follower decides upon his quantity and after that the leader once again decides upon his quantity that does not have to be equal to the first announced quantity. The leader's first announcement does not affect payoffs.
We also study two different information conditions, the complete information case and the case where the follower does not see the leader's payoffs in the payoff matrix (the incomplete information case). Both players see the outcome after each round, i.e. the follower sees the leader's payoff from the outcome even when he does not see the leader's payoffs in the payoff matrix. The games are played in fixed pairs as well as with random matching; in the latter case the pairs are reformed randomly after each round. The eight different settings in the experiment are presented in Table 1 .
The relevant theoretical outcomes are denoted L, N, JO, LS, and F in the payoff matrix in Figure 1 . These markings were not included in the matrix shown to the subjects. In the Stackelberg equilibrium (L) payoffs are 72 for the leader and 36 for the follower. The Stackelberg equilibrium is the unique subgame perfect equilibrium of the one-shot Stackelberg game. In the Cournot-Nash equilibrium outcome (N) the payoffs are equal and 64 for both. The Cournot-Nash outcome is, however, a dominated equilibrium in the Stackelberg game. In the joint-optimum (JO) the players receive their jointly maximal payoffs, resulting in payoffs 72 for both. In the second-play Stackelberg outcome (LS) payoffs are 81 for the leader and 54 for the follower. The leader chooses the first announcement in the anticipation that the follower reacts to it with the best response. The
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payoffs in this outcome are better for both players than in the Stackelberg equilibrium outcome in the Stackelberg game. However, because the leader's first announcement is cheap talk, the follower should not believe in it and react by a best response. Rather, a rational follower realizes that he is the actual leader in the second-play Stackelberg game.
Even though a rational follower does not behave as a Stackelberg follower in the secondplay game, his behavior as the Stackelberg leader depends on the information condition. If there is complete information and if the follower knows that the first announcement of the leader is cheap talk, he will always ignore the announcement and act as a leader. The Stackelberg equilibrium with the follower as the leader (F) results in payoffs 36 for the leader and 72 for the follower. When the follower does not know the leader's payoffs, it is not possible to choose the quantity from the leader's reaction curve that maximizes the follower's payoff given that the leader best responds to it. Hence, the follower must decide whether to believe in the announcement or not. If he does not believe in it, some kind of a decision rule is needed. This could be e.g. to use the maximin rule, where the follower chooses so that his smallest possible payoffs are maximized (see e.g. Osborne and Rubinstein, 1994) . Believing in the leader's cheap talk announcement comes to question if the follower can be certain that the leader does not deviate from the announcement and cheat. In this case, a trusting relationship should first be established. The players can create trust by e.g. choosing such that fair payoffs result for both.
The experiment was conducted in a computer classroom and run over a web-based software. A session in the experiment proceeded as follows. The roles of A (leader) and B (follower) were randomly assigned to the subjects' computers. The subjects did not know who their opponent was. First, the subjects read the instructions (see Appendix B) and started the first round.
After each completed round, the subjects saw the outcome and waited until everyone was finished with the round. Then a new round started. At all times, the subjects saw the game history over the rounds completed (payoffs and decisions), in the left sidebar of their computer screen. At the beginning, the subjects were told the approximate length of the session, but the exact number of rounds was not revealed, and the ending of the experiment came as a surprise. After the final round was reached, the subjects answered a set of questions and were then instructed how to receive their monetary payoffs.
The experiment was arranged in 17 sessions. In each session, the pairs repeated the game for 20 to 24 rounds (we use only 20 rounds from each setting in the result analysis). Only one game setting was used in each session. Table 1 shows the games in the experiment and the different numbers of rounds and players in them.
----------------- Table 1 -
The sessions were arranged at Aalto University, Espoo, Finland, in fall 2009 and spring 2010. A total of 210 subjects participated. Each subject participated in only one session. The subjects were Finnish speaking students. There were 35 female subjects. The subjects were paid a cash reward based on their personal payoffs in two rounds that were randomly drawn from the last ten rounds. The reward was calculated as a sum of these two rounds' payoffs, divided by twenty, and rounded up to the nearest 0.50 euros (however, the rounding was not communicated to the subjects beforehand). The average reward was 6.76 euros (approximately USD 9.00 in March 2010).
Results
The results are presented in Figures A.1 
Q4. How does incomplete information affect the results discussed in the aforementioned questions?
Questions 1 -3 deal with the complete information settings, and question 4 deals with the incomplete information settings. Question 3 deals with the second-play games with complete information, and question 4 with incomplete information.
Q1. Do the players play Stackelberg outcomes? Are the leaders or the followers better off?
Fixed pairs: There are no outcomes LS or F in the second-play game, and there are only a few Stackelberg outcomes L in both Stackelberg and second-play games. These outcomes are not more popular than any other outcomes that are played. In the Stackelberg game, the median payoff is 61.5 for the leaders (which is 10.5 payoff points below their Stackelberg equilibrium payoff) and 72 for the followers (36 payoff points above their Stackelberg equilibrium payoff); see Table 2 . In all rounds, when payoffs are not equal, there are more followers having greater payoffs than there are leaders having greater payoffs (Table 3 a) .
Hence, the leaders do not have higher payoffs than the followers, but vice versa. However, because as much as 60 % of outcomes within the last five rounds have equal payoffs, the followers who are better off are in a minority.
In the second-play game, the median payoff is 72 for the leaders (which is equal to their payoff in the Stackelberg equilibrium) and 64 for the followers (18 payoff points above their Stackelberg equilibrium payoff); see Table 2 . When payoffs are not equal, there are more leaders having greater payoffs than there are followers having greater payoffs (second stage payoffs, see Table 3 b). Hence, the followers do not have higher payoffs than leaders in the second-play game, as would be the case if the followers acted as leaders. Also, because about 40 % of outcomes within all the rounds have unequal payoffs, the number of leaders being better off is higher than the number of followers being better off most of the time. In the Stackelberg game, the median payoff is 63 for the leaders (which is 9 payoff points below their Stackelberg equilibrium payoff) and 52 for the followers (16 payoff points above their Stackelberg equilibrium payoff); see Table 2 . In all rounds, when payoffs are not equal, there are more leaders having greater payoffs than followers, and in rounds 6-10, the frequencies are even at 40 % (Table 5 a) . Because the number of equal payoff outcomes remains at or below 24 % (in rounds 11-15, see Table 5 a), the majority of leaders have higher payoffs than followers. Hence, the leaders are better off, as predicted by the Stackelberg model, even though the exact Stackelberg outcomes are rare.
In the second-play game, the median payoff is 54 for the leaders (which is 18 payoff points below their Stackelberg equilibrium payoff) and 56 for the followers (20 payoff points above their Stackelberg equilibrium payoff); see Table 2 . These median payoffs are almost equal, and it can also be seen that as much as 51 % of outcomes within the last five rounds have equal payoffs (second stage payoffs, Table 5 b). There are slightly more followers having higher payoffs than leaders (Table 5 b) . Hence, followers are slightly better off than leaders.
------------------ Table 2 - There are some other equal payoff outcomes, but the share of these is not notable compared to the share of joint-optimum outcomes.
The joint-optimum outcomes increase faster in the second-play game than in the Stackelberg game: in the second-play game, there is already a share of 34 % of joint-optimum outcomes within rounds 6-10, but in the Stackelberg game, the share of joint-optimum outcomes does not reach 30 % until rounds 11-15. (Tables 3 a and In addition to the second-play game having more equal-payoff outcomes, they also increase faster on the second-play game than on the Stackelberg game. However, as Table 5 a shows, the share of equal payoff outcomes in the Stackelberg game reaches a level of 24 % in rounds 11-15 before dropping to 16 % in the last rounds.
Q3. Is cheap talk effective? Is cheap talk used for selfish purposes, or to coordinate cooperation?
If cheap talk would not be effective, then the leaders should be in the position of followers and get worse payoffs than the followers. Thus, if the leaders do better than the followers in the second-play games, we can infer that cheap talk is effective. Another way to look at the effectiveness of cheap talk is to compare the second-play game to the Stackelberg game: if the leaders in second-play games get higher payoffs than in Stackelberg games, then cheap talk is effective. On the other hand, as we saw in questions 1 and 2, leaders as first movers are not always better off in the Stackelberg game.
In fixed pairs, in median payoffs the answer to this question is affirmative. The leaders in the second-play game have a median payoff of 72 (which is their Stackelberg equilibrium payoff), and the followers have a median payoff of 64 (which is 18 payoff points above their Stackelberg equilibrium payoff); see Table 2 . When the payoffs are not equal, there are more leaders being better off than followers in the second-play game (Table 5 a), but in the Stackelberg game, there are more followers being better off than leaders (Table 3 a) . Also, in terms of median payoffs, leaders are better off in the fixed pairs second-play game than in the fixed pairs Stackelberg game, by a difference of 10.5 payoff points. Hence, cheap talk is effective.
In random matching, answering this question is not as straightforward. The median payoffs in the second-play game are 54 for the leaders (which is 18 payoff points less than their Stackelberg equilibrium payoff) and 56 for the followers (20 payoff points more than their Stackelberg equilibrium payoff). The number of equal payoff outcomes in the second-play game is 51 % in the last five rounds, and there is a share of 27 % of outcomes where followers are better off in the last five rounds, while for the leaders this figure is 22 %. In the second-play game, the leaders have lower median payoffs than in the Stackelberg game, by a difference of 9 payoff points. Hence, cheap talk is not effective.
Another indication of the effectiveness of cheap talk is also that, as discussed in Q2, equal payoff outcomes increase faster in second-play games than in Stackelberg games.
Yet another question is how cheap talk is used. We can look at how the payoffs change between the first stage and the second stage. (See Tables 4 and 6 . The payoffs in the first stage are only hypothetical and determined by the leader's cheap talk announcement and the follower's response to it. They are also payoffs that would be attained if the leaders kept to their cheap talk announcements at the second stage.) In the fixed pairs second-play game, for those pairs who converge to the joint-optimum outcome, the payoffs remain mostly unchanged between the first and the second stage, as the comparison in Table 4 shows. Thus, when a joint-optimum outcome is attained, the leader does not change his decision from the announced quantity in the second stage.
This could be a way of building trust in the repeated interactions. Hence, when the game has converged to the joint-optimum, the leader uses the cheap talk announcement to support cooperation.
The way that cheap talk is used is different in random matching, because a high percentage of the payoffs change between the first and the second stages (Table 6 .) This implies that the leaders change their announcements in the second stage. However, as we discussed in Q2, there are no joint-optimum outcomes in random matching. It is possible that in random matching the leaders try to use cheap talk more strategically than in fixed pairs. Table 4 - Table 6 -----------------
-------------------
------------------- -----------------
Q4. How does incomplete information affect the results discussed in the aforementioned questions?
Our results from the incomplete information settings are almost similar to those of complete information, but there are two exceptions. First, in fixed pairs, the share of joint-optimum outcomes in the incomplete information Stackelberg game is at most 17 %, while it is above 40 % in the complete information Stackelberg game and in both the complete and incomplete information second-play games (Tables 3 a and 3 b) . The frequency of other equal payoff outcomes in the incomplete information Stackelberg game with fixed pairs is 50 % in the last rounds. Of these equal payoff outcomes, 16 % are Cournot-Nash outcomes. Second, in random matching, the frequency of equal payoff outcomes in the complete information Stackelberg game are lower, at most at 16 %, than in the Stackelberg game with incomplete information and in the random matching second-play games, where shares of equal-payoff outcomes are at least 48 % in the last rounds (Tables 5 a and 5 b).
The incomplete information settings partly reveal how cheap talk works, particularly in fixed pairs. In the fixed pairs Stackelberg game with incomplete information, where the frequency of joint-optimum and other equal payoff outcomes are lower than in other fixed pairs settings, the payoff distribution is also more uneven. Lower frequency of joint-optimum play probably reflects the follower's lack of trust on the leader's behavior, and the higher frequency of leader's greater payoffs reflects the leader's disregard of equal payoffs (at 39 % of outcomes the leaders have higher payoffs than followers at rounds 11-20; see Table 3 a). But, because this anomaly does not exist at the second-play games with incomplete information, it seems that the leader's cheap talk possibility reflects the tendency to equal payoffs even when the follower does not know the leader's payoffs.
Discussion and conclusions
Two of our experimental settings, the complete information Stackelberg game with fixed pairs and random matching, are the same as the Stackelberg experiments of Huck et al. (2001) . A notable difference in our experiments is that we had an interactive computerized system, whereas in Huck et al. (2001) the participants used pen and paper. Our experiments were run over twenty rounds and the total number of rounds was not known by the players beforehand. The number of rounds in the Huck et al. (2001) experiments was only ten and this was known to the players. Still, our results are similar as those of Huck et al. (2001, p. 757) . One of the key common observations is that there are very few Stackelberg outcomes. In random matching the share of Stackelberg outcomes in the Stackelberg game with complete information is only 6 % in the beginning, and 4 % in the final rounds. Even if the leader chooses a quantity decision that is equal or close to the Stackelberg equilibrium, the follower often chooses a quantity that is not his best response, but one that makes both players' payoffs worse ( Figures A.1 --A.12 ). This is also observed by Huck et al. (2001, p. 757) , who report that the leaders compromise "between the [Stackelberg equilibrium] and the symmetric Cournot equilibrium", and that the followers "produce, on average, about one unit more than" their best response. Also, in our results as well as in the Huck et al. (2001) results, there are many attempts to play the joint-optimum in the fixed pairs Stackelberg games, but in contrary in random matching there are hardly any attempts to play the joint-optimum. Some pairs reach the joint-optimum or the Cournot-Nash outcomes quickly in a few rounds, but for others it takes ten or more rounds. This is more than the duration of the Huck et al. (2001) experiment.
Our main results are that a high proportion of players converge to the joint-optimum outcomes in fixed pairs both in the new second-play setting as well as in the regular Stackelberg game, and that most of the players converge to the Cournot-Nash outcomes in random matching in both settings. We also observe that contrary to the theoretical possibility that the second-play Stackelberg setting offers, there are only a few followers who take the Stackelberg leader's role and benefit from that. Also, in fixed pairs settings the leaders seem to use cheap talk not to gain selfish benefits, but to reassure the followers of the joint-optimum play. The players can create mutual trust and reach outcomes that benefit both participants in fixed pairs, but this is not possible in random matching. In random matching players typically end up in Cournot-Nash play.
The important general conclusion from our results is that cheap talk is used to support cooperative behavior. The cooperative interest is not diminished by the explicit possibility to cheat by cheap talk and second-play. By announcing the joint-optimum with cheap talk the leader reduces the follower's uncertainty about the leader's second stage decision. When the follower does not know the leader's payoffs, reassurance with cheap talk is particularly important. Thus our results provide strong evidence supporting the related hypothesis presented earlier in the literature that cheap talk is a way to coordinate and reassure (Crawford, 1998, and Ellingsen and Östling, 2010) .
There are topics for future research that naturally emerge. The first one being does the selection of the subjects have an impact on the results? Does the fact that the subjects are of the same social group, i.e. students, have an effect? Second, does the level of rewards have an effect? Would the cooperation level be lower in a high stake game?
Appendix B: Translated instructions
Welcome to the market experiment You are now in an experiment hosted by the Systems Analysis Laboratory. The time it will take is about 60 minutes.
Proceed by following the instructions that will be displayed on your screen. Do not use the back button of your browser, and do not open new windows. If you have any questions during the experiment, please refer to the supervisor running the experiment.
In the market experiment, we study human behavior in experimental markets consisting of two firms. Both firms make choices on production quantities of the same product. The total production quantity ending up in the market affects the payoffs of the firms. By making deliberate choices, the firms (=participants) can earn euros from the markets.
You represent a firm, and you encounter another firm in a market situation. This is The round ends and both firms see the final choices and payoffs for each of them. The results and choices made in the previous rounds are displayed during the subsequent rounds. There will be several rounds, and the program will let you know when the experiment ends.
The personal payoffs are calculated as follows: two rounds are selected randomly out of the ten last ones. The average payoff of these two rounds is calculated. This average is divided by ten, which is the payoff in euros. The experiment supervisor will inform you how the payoff will be given to you.
Please use a moment to familiarize yourself with this setting. 
